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THE GUANTÁNAMO EFFECT AND SOME
TROUBLING IMPLICATIONS OF LIMITING
HABEAS RIGHTS DOMESTICALLY
Jonathan Hafetz *
The U.S. Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, represents a
microcosm of the Bush administration’s post-9/11 detention and
interrogation policy, the embodiment of a prison beyond the law.
The administration established the prison at Guantánamo based
upon two overarching constructs: first, that detainees are “enemy
combatants” or “unlawful combatants” who have no substantive
rights under domestic or international law; and second, that detainees have no right to judicial review because they are foreign
nationals imprisoned outside the sovereign territory of the United
States. As a December 2001 memo (leaked to the press in 2004)
suggests, the administration brought prisoners to Guantánamo
precisely to avoid habeas corpus review, which it recognized would
enable courts to question and possibly invalidate the detentions.1
The administration has defended its creation of a law-free
prison at Guantánamo by stressing the differences between the
mainland United States and a military base on an outlying island
that it occupies pursuant to a lease with Cuba. At the same time,
however, the administration has interpreted recent legislation—
the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA)2—to elide any such
differences where the domestic detention of alleged alien “enemy
combatants” is concerned. In my remarks today, I will provide a
brief account of Guantánamo’s continually evolving relationship
with domestic detention policy. I will suggest how the administration has engaged in logical convolutions to make what it considers
a rights-free zone at Guantánamo the model for the preventive detention of aliens inside the United States. I will begin by tracing
how the administration has attempted to justify detention practices
in Guantánamo by isolating them from domestic law and how the
* Litigation Director, Liberty and National Security Project, Brennan Center for
Justice at NYU School of Law. I would like to thank the staff of the New York City Law
Review for arranging this timely and important symposium, and for inviting me to
participate. This Transcript is an edited copy of my remarks.
1 Memorandum for William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def., from Patrick F. Philbin & John C. Yoo, in THE TORTURE PAPERS (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua
L. Dratel eds., 2005).
2 Pub. L. No. 109–366, § 7 120 Stat. 2600, 2636 (2006).
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federal courts have responded. I will then explain how the administration is now seeking to import Guantánamo’s template for indefinite executive detention into the domestic United States
through the MCA and to eclipse the very differences it has previously invoked in justifying its actions at Guantánamo. Thus, rather
than ending the failed experiment at Guantánamo, the administration is seeking to extend and institutionalize it.
From the beginning, the administration has defined Guantánamo in relationship to the United States. Until 2004, the administration argued that Guantánamo detainees could not invoke the
protections of the federal habeas corpus statute3 because they were
foreign nationals detained outside the sovereign territory of the
United States.4 In Rasul v. Bush,5 the Supreme Court rejected this
argument.6 As long as the prisoners’ ultimate custodians could be
reached by service of process, the Court explained, the prisoners
had the right to invoke the habeas jurisdiction of a federal district
court.7 Noting the United States’ complete and exclusive power
and control over Guantánamo, the Court also observed that the
extension of habeas rights to detainees there was consistent with
the historical purpose and scope of the common law writ.8 In his
concurring opinion, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy similarly emphasized the particular nature of Guantánamo, explaining that it “is in
every practical respect a United States territory.”9
Rasul thus narrowed the gap between Guantánamo and the
mainland United States by rejecting the administration’s argument
that the naval base was outside the territorial jurisdiction of any
federal district court and extending habeas corpus rights to prisoners confined there. Though physically outside the United States,
Guantánamo was not beyond its laws, or at least not beyond the
reach of the writ of habeas corpus.
The administration, however, moved quickly to reestablish
3

28 U.S.C. § 2241, et seq.
The administration also argued that the Guantánamo detainees lacked any constitutional rights for the same reason.
5 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
6 Under the terms of the 1903 lease agreement with Cuba, the United States exercises “complete jurisdiction and control” over the naval base at Guantánamo, while
Cuba retains “ultimate sovereignty” over the territory. Under a 1934 treaty, the lease
agreement remains in effect absent an agreement by both sides to alter or abrogate
the lease, as long as the United States does not abandon the naval station. The treaty
thus effectively gives the United States control of Guantánamo in perpetuity. Rasul,
542 U.S. at 471.
7 Id. at 478–79.
8 Id. at 481.
9 Id. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
4
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Guantánamo’s separate status. Nine days after Rasul, the administration created a summary military process—the Combatant Status
Review Tribunal (CSRT)10—to block consideration of pending and
future habeas petitions in district court. It sought to justify the creation of the CSRT under Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,11 where the plurality
had suggested in dicta that an “appropriately authorized and properly constituted military tribunal” could, in certain limited circumstances, initially determine a citizen–detainee’s status following his
capture on a battlefield.12 The CSRT, however, suffered from both
glaring procedural inadequacies and substantive overbreadth, and
was extended far beyond the narrow parameters of the traditional
battlefield capture of an enemy soldier presented in Hamdi. Procedurally, the CSRT denied detainees basic safeguards, such as an
opportunity to see the evidence against them, the assistance of
counsel, and a chance to present evidence in their defense. The
CSRT also relied on information gained by coercion, including torture.13 Substantively, the CSRT defined “enemy combatant” in
terms so broad that it encompassed not only individuals who directly participated in armed conflict against the United States in
Afghanistan (the limited definition upheld in Hamdi), but also individuals who never took part in hostilities or directly or intentionally supported terrorist activities.14 And, in fact, Defense
10 Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal, available at http://
www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf.
11 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion).
12 Id. at 538. The Hamdi plurality made clear, however, that absent such a process,
a habeas court must determine the merits of a petitioner’s claim in the first instance.
Id. Hamdi, therefore, never sanctioned the ex post use of such military status tribunals
at Guantánamo, where they were hastily and cynically thrown together more than two
years after the prisoners’ capture and conducted thousands of miles from any battlefield in order to deny detainees any meaningful review. Nor did the plurality sanction
the use of a military tribunal for a person who, on the government’s allegations, was
not captured in a theater of war and did not fall within the traditional, law-of-warbound definition of an “enemy combatant” upheld in Hamdi. See id. at 516 (defining
“enemy combatant”).
13 See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 472–75 (D.D.C.
2005); Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 1006 (D.C. Cir.) (Rogers, J., dissenting), cert.
granted 127 S. Ct. 3067 (2007). While the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109–48, 119 Stat. 2680 (2005) (“DTA”), requires the CSRT to assess whether evidence was obtained by coercion, it applies only to CSRTs conducted after the Act’s
passage, and thus not to the CSRTs that were conducted for nearly all of the detainees
at Guantánamo. In addition, the DTA does not prohibit the use of coerced statements but merely requires the CSRT to determine those statements’ “probative
value.” Id. § 1005(b).
14 In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 475 (noting the administration’s position that it could designate as an “enemy combatant” a little old lady in
Switzerland who unwittingly donates money to a charity which she believes is providing humanitarian assistance but which is secretly supporting terrorist activities).
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Department data indicates that fewer than half of the Guantánamo
detainees are accused of committing a hostile act while more than
half of the Guantánamo detainees are being held based merely
upon alleged “association” with some group, whether al Qaeda,
Taliban, or another organization.15
The CSRT sought to underscore the differences between
Guantánamo and the United States. It applied only to detainees at
Guantánamo even though three individuals in the United States
were detained as “enemy combatants” when the CSRT was established: Yaser Hamdi (whose case was on remand after the Supreme
Court decision);16 Jose Padilla (a U.S. citizen arrested at Chicago’s
O’Hare International Airport and detained at the Naval Consolidated Brig in Charleston, South Carolina); and Ali Saleh Kahlah alMarri (a lawful resident alien from Qatar arrested at home in Peoria, Illinois, and also detained at the Brig in Charleston, South Carolina).17 The government did not attempt to convene a CSRT for
these individuals, including for Mr. Hamdi who had been captured
amid combat in a war zone in Afghanistan. Instead, it acknowledged their right to district court habeas review of the lawfulness of
their executive detention as “enemy combatants,” unimpeded by
military tribunal.18
In addition, the government maintained that Guantánamo detainees had no constitutional rights, notwithstanding Rasul’s indications that they possessed rights at least under the Due Process

15 See Mark Denbeaux & Joshua Denbeaux, Report on Guantánamo Detainees: A Profile of 517 Detainees Through Analysis of Department of Defense Data, available at http://
law.shu.edu/aaafinal.pdf.
16 Mr. Hamdi was captured in Afghanistan. He was initially taken to Guantánamo,
but after the United States realized he was an American citizen, Mr. Hamdi was transferred to the United States and imprisoned in naval brigs, first in Norfolk, Virginia,
and then in Charleston, South Carolina. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510 (plurality opinion).
17 I am lead counsel for Mr. al-Marri and represent him in his habeas corpus case
and in a separate lawsuit challenging his mistreatment and conditions of detention.
18 Before the district court habeas hearing commenced, the government released
Mr. Hamdi in exchange for his renouncing his U.S. citizenship, returning to Saudi
Arabia where he had lived most of his life, and agreeing to certain limitations on his
future travel. See Jerry Markon, Hamdi Returned to Saudi Arabia, WASH. POST, Oct. 12,
2004, at A2. The government continued to detain Mr. Padilla as an “enemy combatant” until finally charging him with federal crimes only two business days before its
opposition to Mr. Padilla’s petition for certiorari was due in the Supreme Court,
which was on the verge of deciding whether to hear Mr. Padilla’s habeas corpus challenge to his three-and-one-half-year-long military detention. See Padilla v. Hanft, 432
F.3d 582 (4th Cir. 2005). The government continues to detain Mr. al-Marri as an
“enemy combatant.” See Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2007), rehearing en
banc granted (Aug. 22, 2007).
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Clause of the Fifth Amendment.19 Thus, the government contended, Rasul had merely established the detainees’ right to file
petitions in district court under the habeas statute; and, since the
detainees had no substantive rights to enforce, their habeas petitions should be summarily dismissed.20 The government, in short,
sought to gut Rasul of any practical force and reduce habeas jurisdiction to an empty vessel whose only function would be to reinforce Guantánamo’s separate status as a territory outside the
United States and the protections of its Constitution and laws.
Two district courts divided over whether the Constitution applied to Guantánamo detainees. In In re Guantánamo Detainee Cases,
District Judge Joyce Hens Green held that the Guantánamo detainees had rights under the Due Process Clause21 and that the CSRT
violated those rights by denying them access to counsel, relying on
secret evidence, allowing for the use of evidence gained by torture,
and employing an overbroad definition of “enemy combatant.”22
In Khalid v. Bush,23 however, District Judge Richard Leon ruled
that the Guantánamo detainees had no cognizable rights and dismissed their habeas petitions.24 While the appeals of those cases
were pending, Congress enacted two laws limiting the rights of
Guantánamo detainees. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
(DTA)25 purported to eliminate jurisdiction over habeas corpus
petitions filed by or on behalf of Guantánamo detainees and to vest
exclusive jurisdiction in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit to review final CSRT decisions under an alternative procedure. The DTA, as written, narrowly limited the scope
of the D.C. Circuit’s review to the CSRT record and prevented detainees from submitting additional evidence, even if that evidence
19 See 542 U.S. at 483–84 n.15. “Petitioners’ allegations—that although they have
engaged neither in combat nor in acts of terrorism against the United States, they
have been held in Executive detention for more than two years in territory subject to
the long-term, exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States, without access
to counsel and without being charged with any wrongdoing—unquestionably describe ‘custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); cf. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277–778
(1990) (Kennedy J., concurring), and cases cited therein.” See also id. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasizing that Guantánamo was in all practical respects the
same as U.S. territory).
20 Alternatively, the government claimed, the CSRT satisfied any rights the Guantánamo detainees may have had.
21 355 F. Supp. 2d at 454.
22 Id. at 468–78.
23 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005).
24 Id. at 323.
25 Pub. L. No. 109–48, 119 Stat. 2680 (2005).
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would disprove allegations of terrorism or other belligerent activity.26 In addition, the DTA eliminated any federal court jurisdiction to consider claims other than those seeking review of CSRT
determinations, thus barring challenges to a detainee’s prolonged
isolation or other conditions of confinement, abuse or threatened
abuse by U.S. officials, or rendition to another country to face torture or continued imprisonment without due process.27
Four months after the Supreme Court ruled in 2006 in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld28 that the DTA did not repeal jurisdiction over
pending habeas cases,29 Congress enacted the MCA, once again
seeking to curtail habeas rights.30 Unlike the DTA, however, the
MCA’s court-stripping provisions were not limited to detainees at
Guantánamo but applied to a broader class of “alien[s] detained by
the United States” who fell within the terms of the statute.31
In February 2007, the D.C. Circuit issued its opinion in
Boumediene v. Bush,32 the consolidated appeal of the district court
decisions In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases and Khalid v. Bush. The
D.C. Circuit upheld the MCA’s repeal of habeas jurisdiction over
the Guantánamo detainee cases.33 It sought to resuscitate the
bright-line rule rejected by the Supreme Court in Rasul, accentuating the differences between Guantánamo and the United States
and ruling that detainees at Guantánamo had no constitutional
rights because they were foreign nationals captured and detained
outside the sovereign territory of the United States.34 Indeed, the
26 Id. § 1005(e)(2); see also Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 1006-07 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (describing limits of the D.C. Circuit’s review under the DTA); Id. at 476 F.3d at
1005 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (“Far from merely adjusting the mechanism for vindicating the habeas right, the DTA imposes a series of hurdles while saddling each Guantánamo detainee with an assortment of handicaps that make the obstacles
insurmountable.”).
27 DTA § 1005(e)(1).
28 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2004).
29 Id. at 2762–69.
30 MCA § 7, 120 Stat. 2636. The MCA also contained numerous other provisions
affecting detainees, providing statutory authorization for military commissions that
the Supreme Court held in Hamdan was lacking, id. § 3, 110 Stat. 2602–2603, and
purporting to limit the enforceability of the Geneva Conventions, id. § 5, 120 Stat.
2631.
31 Id. § 5, 120 Stat. 2636.
32 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
33 Id. at 994.
34 Id. at 991–92. District Judge James Robertson had previously reached the same
conclusion in upholding the MCA’s repeal of habeas corpus jurisdiction over the
claims of Salim Hamdan, the detainee who before had successfully challenged the
President’s military commissions in the Supreme Court. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 464
F. Supp. 2d 9, 18–19 (D.D.C. 2006) (finding that Guantánamo detainees could not
invoke the protection the Suspension Clause because they were foreign nationals cap-
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D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Boumediene means that Congress need not
have afforded any judicial review to Guantánamo detainees in repealing habeas jurisdiction under the DTA and MCA, and remains
free in the future to leave their detention and treatment entirely to
the discretion of the political branches.
The Supreme Court initially denied review in Boumediene.35
However, three Justices dissented from the denial of certiorari,36
and two Justices issued a separate statement explaining that the
detainees first needed to exhaust available remedies by seeking review in the D.C. Circuit under the DTA of their final CSRT decisions.37 Then, on June 29, 2007, the Supreme Court reversed
course, granting the petitioners’ motion to reconsider the Court’s
prior denial of the petitions for certiorari and agreeing to hear the
case.38
At the same time that the administration is emphasizing the
distinctions between Guantánamo and the United States in
Boumediene, it is trying to blur those distinctions in arguing that the
MCA validly eliminates habeas corpus for foreign nationals seized
and detained inside the United States. This interpretive move
threatens to extend a detention model purportedly designed for
an extraterritorial rights-free zone to the United States and eviscerates previously well-established constitutional protections guaranteed to resident aliens.
The MCA purports to repeal habeas jurisdiction over the petition filed by or on behalf of an “alien detained by the United
States” who “has been determined by the United States to have
been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such
determination.”39 Congress intended this language to reach foreign nationals detained at Guantánamo and other off-shore prisons such as Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan who had undergone or
were slated to undergo an executive branch review determination
of their “enemy combatant” status, such as a CSRT or other executured and detained outside the sovereign territory of the United States). Judge Robertson had also stated that if the MCA were applied to a foreign national with
constitutional rights, it would violate the Suspension Clause. Id. at 16 (“If and to the
extent that the MCA operates to make the writ unavailable to a person who is constitutionally entitled to it, it must be unconstitutional.”).
35 127 S. Ct. 1478 (2007).
36 Id. at 1479 (Breyer, J., joined by Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
37 Id. at 1478 (Stevens and Kennedy, JJ., respecting the denial of certiorari).
38 Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3067 (2007). As in the D.C. Circuit, the two
cases—Boumediene v. Bush and Al Odah v. United States—have been consolidated in the
Supreme Court. Id.
39 MCA, § 7, 120 Stat. 2631.
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tive branch tribunal. The administration, however, has interpreted
this provision to eliminate jurisdiction over the habeas petitions of
foreign nationals arrested and detained inside the United States if
they are designated “enemy combatants” by the executive branch
or are merely “awaiting such determination.”
The administration, accordingly, has urged the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to dismiss the petitioner’s appeal in
Al-Marri v. Wright, the case involving the only individual presently
detained in the United States as an “enemy combatant.”40 The administration had not previously contested the federal courts’
habeas jurisdiction in Al-Marri, nor had it ever convened a CSRT
for Mr. al-Marri even though the CSRT had been in place for
Guantánamo detainees for more than two years. Yet, the administration now claims that the federal courts lack habeas jurisdiction
to hear Mr. al-Marri’s challenge to the President’s legal authority to
detain him as an “enemy combatant.” Thus, the administration
claims for the first time, lawful resident aliens, including immigrants who have lived in this country for generations, have no more
right to habeas corpus than aliens captured and held outside the
country. Instead, the only procedure resident aliens can possibly
invoke to challenge their indefinite executive detention as “enemy
combatants” is DTA review of a CSRT decision—a procedure specifically designed for Guantánamo detainees, individuals who, the
administration has consistently asserted, and who members of Congress who voted for habeas-stripping legislation believe, have no
constitutional rights. Moreover, access to that limited review procedure is not a right but remains within the complete and sole discretion of the Executive who determines when, if ever, to convene
a CSRT, and thus when, if ever, to afford detainees access to an
Article III court.41
Mr. al-Marri and numerous amici have argued that the MCA
does not apply to aliens living in the United States and would violate the Constitution if interpreted otherwise.42 In particular, the
40

See Al-Marri v. Wright, No. 06-7437 (4th Cir.).
The administration has stated that if Mr. al-Marri’s appeal is dismissed, the Defense Department would convene a CSRT for Mr. al-Marri, and that Mr. al-Marri
could “avail” himself of review in the D.C. Circuit under the DTA if the CSRT finding
were adverse. See Respondent–Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction
and Proposed Briefing Schedule, at 5, Al-Marri v. Wright, No. 06-7437 (4th Cir.).
However, no statute or regulation requires that Mr. al-Marri be given a CSRT (or
when), leaving his access to an Article III court within the complete and unfettered
control of the executive branch, something the Constitution prohibits absent a valid
suspension of the writ.
42 The briefs of the parties and amici curiae filed in the Fourth Circuit are availa41
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MCA, if construed to repeal habeas jurisdiction over Mr. al-Marri’s
claim, would deny a lawful resident alien any right to challenge his
indefinite executive detention in an Article III court and would
eliminate habeas corpus without providing the adequate and effective substitute that the Suspension Clause requires.43 In addition,
the MCA would violate the Equal Protection Clause by denying lawful resident aliens the same fundamental right to habeas review afforded citizens designated as “enemy combatants.”44
On June 11, 2007, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the MCA did
not repeal habeas jurisdiction over the case of a lawful resident
alien such as Mr. al-Marri and that the federal courts retained jurisdiction to hear Mr. al-Marri’s appeal.45 The court also observed
that interpreting the MCA to repeal habeas jurisdiction over Mr. alMarri’s case would raise “serious” constitutional questions.46 The
court further ruled on the merits that the President lacked legal
authority to detain Mr. al-Marri as an “enemy combatant,” concluding that his military detention must cease.47 The government
moved for rehearing en banc, and the full Fourth Circuit agreed to
rehear Mr. al-Marri’s appeal. The case is still pending.
Adoption of the administration’s expansive interpretation of
the MCA’s court-stripping provisions would give the President unprecedented domestic detention authority. It would deny habeas
corpus to non-citizens living lawfully in this country, despite their
longstanding and clearly established constitutional right to invoke
the protections of the writ.48 It would also import to the domestic
United States Guantánamo’s template of indefinite detention
based upon the CSRT’s sweeping definition of an “enemy combatant” and fundamentally flawed procedures. As a result, immigrants
could be imprisoned indefinitely, for months, perhaps even years,
based upon innuendo, suspicion, or mistake, without habeas
corpus or any other meaningful judicial determination of the legality of their detention.
Ironically, then, even as Guantánamo becomes an increasingly
powerful symbol of America’s misguided post-9/11 detention polble at http://www.brennancenter.org/stack_detail.asp?key=102&subkey=39178&init_
key=34493.
43 Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977).
44 See, e.g., Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 369 (1886).
45 Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 166–73 (4th Cir. 2007).
46 Id. at 167–68.
47 Id. at 174–95.
48 See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
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icy—one that recently prompted Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates to call for the prison’s closure49—the administration is seeking to transport Guantánamo’s system of unreviewable executive
detention to the mainland United States. It would not only be unwise policy to extend and expand a detention regime that has
caused America such reputational harm and that cries out for reform. It would also flout longstanding precedents that guarantee
non-citizens in the United States the full protections of the Constitution, including habeas corpus, due process, and equal treatment
under law.
At bottom, the administration’s arguments are unprincipled
and misleading. The administration has established and defended
its detention policies at Guantánamo by stressing that they were
designed to apply extraterritorially. Now it is trying to institutionalize that same system in the United States. If the Guantánamo
prison were to close, as some have proposed, the Guantánamo system might nevertheless live on within the United States, threatening to eliminate fundamental constitutional protections such as
habeas corpus, even for resident aliens whose right to those protections has been long-established. Rather than the United States extending fundamental protections to Guantánamo (as Rasul had
promised and, as I have argued elsewhere, as the Supreme Court’s
decision in that case and the Constitution require),50 the Guantánamo paradigm, with its deliberate elimination of basic protections, such as habeas corpus, and due process would be brought to
the domestic United States. Were that to occur, it would rank as
yet another one of Guantánamo’s troubling, if unintended,
legacies.

49 Thom Shanker & David Sanger, New to Pentagon, Gates Argued for Closing Guantánamo Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2007, at A1.
50 See, e.g., Jonathan Hafetz, Habeas Corpus, Judicial Review, and Limits on Secrecy in
Detentions at Guantánamo, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 127 (2006).

